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Abstract
Here, I study how to obtain an opinion dynamics model for the case
where there areM possible discrete choices and there is need to model how
strong each agent choice is. The new model is obtained as an extension
of the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model. Tech-
nical difficulties with the choice of proper variables for a simple model
are solved. For the symmetrical case, a dimensionless model is found.
However, when analyzing the results, a change of variables seems to be
required for ease of interpretation. Extremism is observed here as well,
generated by the local reinforcement of opinions inside domains of agents
with the same choice.
1 Introduction
Most opinion Dynamics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] either
focus on two choices or define opinion as a value over a continuous range. How-
ever there are several real life situations when people face a choice over more
than two choices. If those choices correspond to an ideological position that can
be represented as projections over a one-dimensional direction, continuous opin-
ion models could, in principle, be used as an approximation to several choices
if ranges are defined over the possible values. By making the role of choosing
clearer, a model with actual many choices might be an improvement over that
approximation. Still, as all the available models are already approximations, us-
ing continuous models we already know could be a good way to move forward.
However, when all possible choices are independent and there is no reasonable
one-dimensional projection, that strategy makes no sense. Examples of situa-
tions where those independent choices happen are not few: choosing a brand
when there are several available, or a sport team, or even picking a candidate
among many in an election not heavily influenced by a single ideological issue.
In those situations, we need models that allow for any number M of choices.
Models with three possible choices do exist and they have become less rare
more recently [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Sometimes, those three options
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do represent independent choices, but the case where there is a third intermedi-
ary option, be it undecided agents or centrists has also been explored. Strongly
opinionated individuals can play a very important role in a public debate, even
when debate only happens in small groups. By simply holding to their opinions
when meeting different groups of people, they can cause a minority to slowly
increase in size until it becomes a majority and wins the debate [8, 26, 27, 28].
Here, I will extend the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Action (CODA)
model [11, 12] to deal with any numberM of choices, taking it beyond a previous
study of the M = 3 case [22]. The general model presented here can be used for
any type of choices, be them independent, aligned on a number of ideological
dimensions or any mixture of those. The general case will be explained I will
show how different assumptions constrain the likelihood matrix parameters of
how agents influence each other. In particular, in the symmetric case, we will
see that the likelihood matrix has only one independent value for any value ofM
and if we look only at the dynamics of opinions, even that value is irrelevant, as
is the case in the traditional CODA. The one-dimensional ideological case will
also be debated and we will see that it does not lead naturally to such an elegant
scenario as in the symmetrical situation. Instead, most of the constraints we
get are inequalities between the likelihood parameters. That is, for large M
we will still have many independent parameters that only have to obey ranking
relationships. Even assuming a reflection symmetry around the middle opinions
does not make the model to have few parameters for large Ms.
To explore the new model in the simpler symmetrical case, simulations have
been prepared. Their results highlight how extreme opinions can be also when
we have more choices. We will also see the consequences of having more choices
for the size of the agreement clusters. Analyzing the simulation outcomes also
helps at understanding a technical problem that comes from this natural exten-
sion of CODA. The simpler model is obtained when we use the odds between
sequential two choices to obtain. But that choice of variables is not so easy to
interpret. That problem can be solved if we keep the simplified model for the
simulation but interpret the output using a transformation to easier variables.
2 The model
Following the notation introduced in a previous paper on the use of Bayesian
modeling as a framework for obtaining opinion dynamics models[12], each agent
i has a personal choice among the values xm, where xm = 1, . . . ,M is one of M
possible finite values 1, · · · ,M , representing each one of the possible M choices.
For each value of xm, agent i has a probabilistic opinion fi(xm) that measures
i belief about how probable it is that each choice is the best one. In the general
case, when interacting with other agents (or observed by them), the actual choice
other agents observe is obtained as a functional of the probability distribution
fi, ai = A[fi]. Here, we will simply assume that this is determined by the case
where the value of fi(x) is maximum.
Each agent assumes there is a best choice x∗ that is not known, only inferred
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by its neighbors. When updating its opinion based on the observation of a
neighbor j, agent i assumes, given each possible choice x∗, there is a likelihood
p(am|x
∗) that a neighbor will choose each possible am. This can be more easily
understood and represented as a likelihood matrix Lmn = p(aj = m|x
∗ = n),
where, obviously,
∑
m Lmn must be 1 for all n. That means, in the general case,
we have M2 −M independent values for the likelihood matrix. That assumes
all agents have homogeneous beliefs about all neighbors. A more general case
can be obtained where each agent i has a different likelihood matrices for each
neighbor j. That would be represented by a matrix Lmnij . This case will
not be discussed here but it can be useful to represent different characteristics,
such as the existence of contrarians [29, 30, 31, 32] or the evolution of trust
[33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38] between the agents[39].
Given the initial probabilistic opinion fi(x, t) agent i has about each possible
value of xn at instant t and that agent i observes its neighbor j favors a choice
am, an update rule can be trivially obtained by applying Bayes Theorem to the
problem. We have, for each possible value xn, assuming agent j was observed
with choice am, that
fi(xn, t+ 1) =
1
N
fi(xn, t)Lmn, (1)
where N =
∑
o fi(xo, t)Lmo is a normalizing constant needed to ensure that∑
n fi(xn, t+ 1) adds up to 1.
In the case of two choices a1 and a2, that is, M = 2, it was possible to
greatly simplify the model by noticing that p(t) = f(x1, t) = 1 − f(x2, t) and
reducing the problem to the logodds variable
νi(t) = ln
pi(t)
1− pi(t)
,
where the choice of agent i is easily obtained from the sign of νi. The divi-
sion cancels the normalization constant and, assuming agent j chooses a1 the
logarithm turns the model into the simple additive rule
νi(t+ 1) = νi(t) + [ln(L11)− ln(L21)] , (2)
where the term in brackets is constant. That allows a renormalized version of
the equation [40] where, in the general case, we simply add ±1, depending on
the choice of the neighbor.
2.1 Choosing convenient variables
In the general case of M possible choices, we can not reduce the probability
problem to one variable. Instead, each agent has M − 1 independent values
fi(xm) that must be updated with each interaction between two agents. If we
still want to get rid of the normalization constant and obtain an additive model,
we have now two possible choices for defining the variable we will actually use.
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One possible attempt to do that is to define a log-odds opinion of agent i about
choice m, given by
νin(t) = ln
fi(xn, t)(t)
1− fi(xn, t)(t)
.
This choice, however, produces a not so simple dynamics. When updating
νim(t+1) from the observation that agent j prefers m, we no longer obtain the
simplifications that led to Equation 2. Here, 1− fi(xn, t)(t) must be calculated
as the sum of all other terms, that is, we need to update the probabilities in
νin(t+ 1) = ln
fi(xn, t)(t+ 1)∑
m 6=n fi(xm, t)(t+ 1)
,
where each fi(xn, t)(t+1) is obtained from Equation 1. While we do get rid of the
normalizing constant, the sum in the denominator prevents us from separating
the logarithm as sums.
The exception is the symmetric case, but only when we are updating the
opinion νin, where n is exactly the choice of the neighbor j and all other choices
are equivalent. In that case, for every specific n, all values of Lmn, when m 6=
n, are equal to the same value l = 1−Lnn
M−1 . In this case, the terms in the
denominator,
∑
m 6=n fi(an, t)Lmn can be factored as we have∑
n6=m
fi(an, t)Lmn = l
∑
m 6=n
fi(am, t) = l(1− fi(an, t)).
Therefore, we obtain, for the opinion associated with the same choice am as the
neighbor,
νim(t+ 1) = νim(t) + ln
[
(M − 1)Lmm
1− Lmm
]
. (3)
Unfortunately, as we need to update νin for all values of n when an interaction
happens, this is not a viable choice.
A distinct alternative, not as elegant as working directly with the values
νin would have been, was proposed for the case where there are exactly three
choices [22]. Instead of using the ratio between the probability of one choice
and its negation, the odds between two actual choices can be used. That is,
we can define (omitting the suffix identifying agent i) ν12 = ln(f(1)/f(2)),
ν23 = ln(f(2)/f(3)), and ν31 = ln(f(3)/f(1)). As, for M = 3, only two of the
three probabilities are really independent, ν31 can be trivially obtained from
ν31 = −ν13 = −(ν12 + ν23). In the general case with M choices, we have M of
those pairwise log-odds variables where M − 1 of them are independent. The
state of the system can be then described by the set of variables
νq(q+1) = ln
f(q)
f(q + 1)
, (4)
where q assumes values in the range 1, · · · ,M − 1. And, of course, νM1 =
−
∑M−1
q=1 νq(q+1). It is worth noticing that νq(q+1) contains all the information
4
about the relative probability (odds) between choices q and q − 1. The odds
that favor q over q − 1 are trivially exp(νq(q+1)). But the actual probability
values for q and q − 1 are not obtainable without the complete set of νs.
When we calculate the update rule, the renormalization terms cancel out
and the final result is a simple multiplication. Once more, by working with
log-odds we obtain simple additive dynamics for the variables νq(q+1). If agent
j is observed to prefer choice m, we have, for every q = 1, . . . ,M
νq(q+1)(t+ 1) = ln
f(q, t+ 1)
f((q + 1), (t+ 1))
= ln
f(q, t)Lmq
f((q + 1), t)Lm(q+1)
,
and, therefore, we get the general additive equation
νq(q+1)(t+ 1) = νq(q+1)(t) + ln
[
Lmq
Lm(q+1)
]
. (5)
Obtaining the M probability values f(q) can be done by solving the system
ofM−1 equations νq(q+1) = ln(f(q)/f(q+1)) plus the normalization condition.
If solving that system was needed to check which value of f(n) was the largest
one and, therefore, the choice of the agent, solving the system could make actual
implementations of the model more demanding computationally. Luckily, this
is not needed, despite the fact that the variables νq(q+1) only compare pairs of
choices. The procedure to find i choice is simple. Take the first pair, ν12. If it
is a positive number, 1 is preferred to 2; otherwise 2 is preferred. We can drop
one of the two in our search for the biggest probability and pick the one with
larger probability, even without calculating the probabilities. If 2 is preferred
to 1, check it against 3, using ν23. If 1 is preferred, however, we actually need
ν13, for the comparison and this is not directly calculated by the update rule.
However, it is trivial to check that ν13 = ν12 + ν23 and we can easily compare
1 and 3 and we will have the choice among the first three options that has the
largest probability. We just have to repeat this procedure until we have checked
all M possible choices.
2.2 Choosing an update matrix L
mm
In the general case, most terms of the matrix Lmm are independent of one an-
other. The only rule they must obey in the general case is the trivial restriction
that
∑
m Lmn = 1 for each possibility n. That is nothing more than stating
that, if n is the best choice, the chances agent j will pick each possible prefer-
ence must add to 1. That means we have M2 −M independent terms in the
general case and the choice of matrix Lmm must be performed carefully in order
to reflect the scenario one is simulating. That multitude of parameters for large
M reflects the fact that evidence in favor of one choice might influence the other
choices relative importance in different ways depending on the scenario.
Fortunately, for the most symmetrical case, the number of independent terms
drops drastically to 1, regardless of M . That case, studied bellow, corresponds
to the situation where all choices are, in principle, identical and independent.
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To illustrate and better understand the more general case, I will also discuss
the problem of choosing Lmm where each choice represent a position over a
one-dimensional issue. Simulations, however, will be limited to the symmetric
case.
2.2.1 Symmetric Choices
In the general case, the only constraint on the likelihood matrix Lmn is the fact
that probabilities conditional to the same possibility must add to one. Luckily,
a common and interesting case corresponds to the symmetrical situation where
all choices are equivalent. The choice of a sport team to cheer for is an example
of that problem. If we assume complete symmetry between all options, we must
have that Lmm = Lnn for all values of m and n, as well as Lmq = Lnq, for
every m 6= q and n 6= q. As consequence, the matrix Lmn will have only one
independent value l, that we can choose as the diagonal term, where Lmm = l
for every m. As the other choices in each line are all equivalent, they must
have the same value and since probabilities for each possibility must add to one
we have that Lmn =
1−l
M−1 for every m 6= n. Unless agents were contrarians
[29, 30, 31, 32], they should also expect that, when n is the best choice, it
should be observed more often than the other alternatives and, therefore, we
must choose values of l that respect the condition l > 1−l
M−1 .
In this case, Equation 5 can be written, when m is the observed choice of
agent j, as
νq(q+1)(t+ 1) = νq(q+1)(t) + ln
[
1−l
M−1
1−l
M−1
]
= νq(q+1)(t),
when q 6= m and q + 1 6= m. When one of those inequalities fail, we have
νq(q+1)(t+ 1) = νq(q+1)(t) + ln
[
l
1−l
M−1
]
= νq(q+1)(t) + λ
for q = m, where λ = ln
[
l(M−1)
1−l
]
> 0, and
νq(q+1)(t+ 1) = νq(q+1)(t) + ln
[
1−l
M−1
l
]
= νq(q+1)(t)− λ
for and q + 1 = m. That is, only the two log-odds variables directly related to
m need to be updated. Interestingly, we can define a renormalized log-odds as
ν∗qm = νqm/λ, so that the update rule becomes, substituting the values of q for
the only cases where there is change,
ν∗(m−1)m(t+ 1) = ν
∗
(m−1)m(t)− 1
ν∗m(m+1)(t+ 1) = ν
∗
m(m+1)(t) + 1 (6)
The meaning of this update rule is trivial. For the pairs that do not involve m,
no change happens. For the two variables ν that relate to m, the odds in favor
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of m are increased in both cases. Equations 6 mean m − 1 becomes less likely
than m and m becomes more likely than m+ 1.
One interesting characteristic of this case, shared with the original CODA
model, is that, after renormalization, we obtain a model where even the single
independent value l of the matrix Lmn is irrelevant to the dynamics. We can
write the whole algorithm and perform the simulation with not a single use
for the value of l. The renormalized variables, in this case, simply tell us how
many interactions in the right direction it would take to reverse the preference
between choices m and m− 1. If one want to recover actual probability values
for the choices, then l is still needed. But that is its only influence in the model.
Choices do not depend on its actual value.
2.2.2 A one-dimensional issue
Another interesting case happens when choices correspond to positions on a
issue that allows for more than two simple choices. Quite often, those positions
can be reasonable represented in a geometrical space [41, 42, 43]. For example,
people might identify themselves along a left-right axis as only left or right.
But it is also possible to observe more options. Centrists are one possibility.
Extreme left and extreme right are more possible cases. For some applications,
therefore, even a simple one dimensional choice might correspond to 3, 5 or
any other number of choices. Of course, those choices can be modeled as a
continuous variable [5, 44]. But, depending on the problem, we might want to
keep the discrete choice as a better way to describe the situation.
Assuming the choices are equivalent to positions on a line implies that some
inequalities must be obeyed by the elements in Lmn. Take, for example, M = 4
and, without loss of generality, the values of q are ordered according to the order
in the line. For each possibility n, values ofm that are more distant from n must
correspond to smaller chances of observation given by Lmn. As an example, the
probability other agents will pick choices 1, 2, 3, or 4 if the best one were 1 must
be in decreasing order. In that case, we must have L11 > L12 > L13 > L14.
That is, if the more extreme option 1 was the best, the chance a neighbor would
choose it should be the largest one, as always. But, more than that, as 2, 3,
and 4 are increasingly further from 1, their likelihood must decrease. Ordering
for different assumptions of which choice is best should also be included. For
example, choice 1 should be a more likely choice for agents if the actual best
option is closer to 1. Notice that this corresponds to conditionals that are
inverted when compared to the previous ordering. Here, we should also have
L11 > L21 > L31 > L41.
While those inequalities are how we translate the one-dimensional structure
in the Lmn matrix, they do not actually decrease the number of parameters.
That is the general case for the one-dimensional problem. But, if we do assume
a few symmetries, we can still work with a few less parameters. The simplest
symmetry we can introduce is a reflection symmetry around the central prefer-
ence (or pair of preferences). That is, we assume the most extremes choices are
equivalent as well as any two options that are equally distant from the two most
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extreme cases. For the example with four choices, we have no central choice, but
we can still obey a reflection symmetry by making Lm1 be the mirror of Lm4,
and the same with Lm2 and Lm3. That cuts the number of update parameters
in half, in this example where M = 4, from 12 to 6.
The question of comparing outer lines (or columns) of the matrix Lmn (lines
1 and 4 in the example) to the inner ones (2 and 3) is not as trivial as it might
first appear, however. It might be reasonable to assume that all diagonal pa-
rameters Lmm should be the same in a symmetric problem. That was the case
when we had 4 identical and independent options. But, in the current spatial
description, it is clear that extreme choices are not the same as intermediate
ones. Symmetry arguments do not work so well here, as those choices are not
necessarily equivalent. The symmetry already imposed in the previous para-
graph implies that L11 = L44 and L22 = L33. But it does not imply that those
two sets should also be equal. That can be the case in a specific implementation,
thus reducing the number of free parameters in Lmn to 5. But there is no a
priori reason to impose that condition.
Furthermore, one might consider that the elements in any inner line or col-
umn should be symmetric. That is, for M = 4 choices, we could have, for
example, L21 = L23. Or, in plain terms, as 1 and 3 are equally distant from
2, the chance to observe them when 2 is the actual best choice should be the
same. That might seem a reasonable assumption but, once more, it does not
follow from the reflection symmetry. It is just as reasonable to consider that,
if a moderate opinion is the best choice, the other moderate opinion would be
more likely than the extreme one. Or to consider that if a moderate position to
one side is the best choice, the extreme position at the same side should be more
likely than the moderate opposite one. All those assumptions can be defended.
They correspond to a choice of metric in the spatial model and that is a much
stronger assumption than pure reflection symmetry. The exception is, when we
have an odd number of possible choices, we will have an actual central one. For
the line corresponding to that choice, reflection symmetry does apply. If the
center is the best choice, moderate left and moderate right should be treated
equally. The same goes for extreme right and extreme left.
Here I will not deal with the problem of defining proper metrics. That is
beyond the scope of the paper and a full study of the one-dimensional problem
will be left for the future.
3 Simulation results
To test how the agent choices and opinions evolve in the M choices case, the
model was implemented using the R software environment [45]. In every sce-
nario, agents where arranged on a non-periodic non-directed square lattice that
defined their neighborhood, that is, who they might observe. To represent more
or less connected situations, simulations were run for agents connect to all their
first neighbors, as well as connections to second, and also third level neigh-
bors. In other words, agents are connected up to the c level. Networks were
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implemented using the igraph package [46].
3.1 Symmetrical case
A series of simulations were run for the symmetrical choices case. They were
all implemented on a square 50 × 50 non-periodic lattice network where each
node corresponds to an agent and the edges define the neighborhoods of each
agent. Agents were connected with the nearest neighbors up to the c level, that
is, when c = 1, all agents were connected to all their first neighbors and nobody
else. The cases c = 1, 2, 3 were studied. In order to observe the influence of the
number of possible choices M on the opinions of agents, simulations were run
for the casesM = 4, 6, 8, 10. Each combination of the parameters c and M were
run 20 times and the average behavior over several runs was observed.
Initial conditions were drawn randomly. For each agent i, an initial weight
wm for each possible choice m was randomly drawn between 0 and 1, to be
made proportional to the probability agent i assigned to choice m. From that,
νq(q+1) for each i was calculated simply by estimating νq(q+1) = ln(wq/wq+1).
Each interaction is done by picking one agent i who will update its opinion
randomly. A second agent j is drawn from the set of those connected to i and
agent i observes j choice m. From that, i updates its opinion variables νq(q+1)
according to Equations 6. Agent i new choice is calculated based on the updated
νq(q+1)(t+1)s. This procedure is repeated until, in average, each agent has had
its opinion updated T times. In all following implementations, T = 50.
Measuring strength of opinion when there are many choices is not as straight-
forward as when there are only two choices where the probability in favor of a
choice is the same as the probability against the competing one. The simplifying
variables νq(q+1) only provide pairwise comparisons. They tell us how much
more (or less) likely is choice q when compared to q+1, but they tell us nothing
about q alone or about every other choices. If a certain qo is the chosen option of
agent i, νqo(qo+1) does tell us how much more probable the chosen option is than
the next option. That next option, however, might just equally be the second
preferred option or the least preferred one (or anything in between). That means
that, while there is some interesting information on the distribution of values
for νqo(qo+1), those distributions must be interpreted carefully. They only tell us
how much more likely the best option qo is when compared to a random other
choice.
As an example, the distributions of νqo(qo+1) can be seen in Figure 1. It
is clear all three values of c show the same basic behavior, with only very
small changes in the curves that can be attributed to random variation. Strong
opinions appear in all cases, with the peaks of most likely opinion strengths
situated in the 20−30 steps range. That means it would take 20-30 interactions
with opposing views to change the preference of those agents for the option qo
over the next one, qo+1. Even cases around and above 50 are observed, basically
suggesting that, for an important fraction of the agents, the majority of their
interactions happened with neighbors who agreed and reinforced their positions.
That was particularly true for smaller values of M , when the distributions had
9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Chosen option over next, c=1
Opinion steps
Co
un
ts
M=4
M=6
M=8
M=10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Chosen option over next, c=2
Opinion steps
Co
un
ts
M=4
M=6
M=8
M=10
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Chosen option over next, c=3
Opinion steps
Co
un
ts
M=4
M=6
M=8
M=10
Figure 1: Distribution of opinions for different numbers of choices, M . The
distribution for νqo(qo+1) is shown in all three graphics. Top: First neighbors
connections (c = 1). Middle: Second neighbors connections (c = 1).Bottom:
Third neighbors connections (c = 3).
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Figure 2: Distribution of opinions for different numbers of choices, M . The
distribution for νqo is shown in all three graphics. Top: First neighbors con-
nections (c = 1). Middle: Second neighbors connections (c = 1).Bottom: Third
neighbors connections (c = 3).
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more important spreads to more extreme opinions. Still, even for M = 10, very
extreme opinions were observed.
To understand how extreme the opinions in favor of the preferred choice
actually are, νqc(qc+1) is not the best measure, however. To answer that question
more correctly, we must separate the impact of each choice. The values of the
probabilities f(q) can be easily obtained by inverting Equation 4. To obtain
number of steps once more, we can estimate the log-odds of the best option qc
against all others added, or, νqo =
f(o)
1−f(o) . Solving the equations we get
νqo =
[
e−νqo(qo+1) + e−(νqo(qo+1)+ν(qo+1)(qo+2)) + . . .+
+e−(νqo(qo+1)+ν(qo+1)(qo+2)+...ν(qo−2)(qo−1))
]−1
,
(7)
where the sum has M − 1 terms and is meant to continue in a circular way,
the terms jumping from q = M back to q = 1. As νqo is a direct comparison
of the best alternative against the sum of all others, its interpretation is much
more direct. It should also be noted that, while νqo(qo+1) must be greater than
zero (since o is the chosen option, it must be preferred to o + 1), the same is
not true for νqo , except when M = 2. We can have an option that is preferred
to all others when compared individually, but still with a probability of being
the best one smaller than 50%.
The distributions for νqo can be seen in Figure 2. While there are a few
observations of values of νqo < 0, corresponding to a probability smaller than
50%, they are very rare. That means the vast majority of agents have interacted
with neighbors that agree with their position more than 50% of the times,
suggesting the existence of very clear opinion domains. Interestingly, while
changing the size of the neighborhood had little effect at the distributions of
νqo(qo+1), the same is not true for νqo . While the distributions for M = 4 still
seem little affected when we observe different values of c, there is a noticeable
difference in behavior for higher values of M when we have only first neighbors
(c = 1). When c = 1, we observe for all values of M the existence of plateaus at
the weaker opinion values. followed by slow decrease in frequency as opinions
get more extreme. For M = 4, that plateau is observed for all values of c and,
in all cases, it extends up to more extreme opinions. But when c = 2 or c = 3
and M is larger then 4, the plateau is replaced by a clear peak close to νqo = 0.
We can also see that, for all values of M , it seems that the more connected
network corresponds to a smaller proportion of the most extreme opinions. We
can also observe that, as M increases, the region of extreme opinions become
less important. But it does not disappear and even as M = 10, we still observe
agents that think their choice is more than 50 steps away from the sum of all
others.
As in the original CODA model, extreme opinions close to the average num-
ber of interactions of each agent are a clear sign of domains. Inside a domain, an
agent will only have its opinion reinforced and that explains its final extremist
views. To visualize those domains, Figure 3 show typical final states after an
average of 50 interactions per agent, for different values of c and M . Different
12
Figure 3: Final configurations after and average of 50 interactions per agent, for
one example run of different values of c andM . Different choices are represented
with specific colors and color tones represent strength of opinion, with lighter
versions corresponding to weaker opinions and darker ones corresponding to
more extreme views. Top line: First neighbors connections (c = 1). Middle:
Second neighbors connections (c = 1).Bottom: Third neighbors connections
(c = 3). First column: M = 4. Second column: M = 6. Third column:
M = 10.
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Figure 4: Average proportion of edges that correspond to interfaces between
choice domains.
choices are represented with specific colors and color tones represent strength
of opinion, with lighter versions corresponding to weaker opinions and darker
ones signaling more extreme views. The figures are organized so that each line
correspond to a different size c of neighborhood (c = 1, 2, 3) and each column
correspond to a different number of choices (M = 4, 6, 10). It is easy to see that
the domains become bigger with c, as it should be expected, since each agent
influence can reach further.
The size of domains seem to also change with M , as the graphics seem more
crowded and with smaller regions, but visual inspection is not so clear now.
To verify that is actually the case, Figure 4 shows the average over 20 runs of
the proportion of interfaces between the domains. Here, the interface is defined
as a network edge that links nodes with different choices. It is easy to notice
that the proportion of interfaces decrease as c gets bigger, meaning that larger
values of c do correspond to larger domains, as we had observed in the final
configuration examples. The apparent observation that a larger number M of
choices correspond to smaller domains is also confirmed, as it is now clear that
the proportion of interfaces does increase as M does.
4 Conclusion
Here, I presented an extension of the CODA model to the case where you have
any number M of possible choices. A simple solution that leads to an additive
model in the general case was found by using paired sequential log-odds between
a choice and the next one. When all choices are independent and symmetric,
we saw that the whole dynamics depends on a single update parameter. As
in the original CODA model, if we are only interested in the dynamics of the
opinions, we can renormalize the variables, obtaining a dimensionless model
with no parameters. The original parameter is only needed if we want to assign
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actual probability values to the number of steps an agent is from flipping its
opinion.
Extreme opinions were observed again in all runs, thanks to the local re-
inforcement that happens once domains form. For smaller values of choices,
at M = 4, a large plateau can be observed from weak to strong opinions, de-
caying only slowly. That general tendency to form a plateau seems to happen
regardless of how many neighbors agents have. Similarly, smaller plateaus were
also observed for all number of choices when only first neighbors interacted. As
the network included more distant edges and M was larger (6, 8, and 10), the
plateau changed to a peak close to a probability of 50% for the preferred choice
(νqo = 0). Both effects might be associated to the longer time it should take for
rigid domains to form when there are more choices (larger M) and also because
more distant neighbors have a larger chance to belong to a different domain, also
contributing to more time being needed before domains stabilize. Indeed, as c
grows, we observed that the domains tend to be larger (less interfaces). Once
those domains do get stable, the local dynamics for agents inside them will make
those agents go to the extremes as every interaction becomes a reinforcing one.
While only the common symmetrical case was used in the simulations, the
model can be used in the general situation. The number of interaction param-
eters in that situation can be large, as can be expected of a general situation
with no symmetries. Exploring all those possibilities, due to the number of
parameters, is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is also interesting to notice that the variables that made modeling eas-
ier, turning the problem into sums even in the general situation, are not the
natural ones to interpret. For measuring the strength of opinions, comparing
each agent estimate of its choice against all others provides better data than
comparing against a random next possibility. That makes a change of variables
necessary once the simulation results are obtained, but only for questions about
the strength of opinion. The evolution of choices and their domains can be
easily described with the original model variables.
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